The Irish judiciary has taken the unprecedented step of publishing a statement about the proposed constitutional amendment clearing the way for a reduction in their salaries in the same way as the wages of other public-sector workers have been cut.

I read it and I have to confess, I was astounded.  Some of it is reasonable enough, but some is plain, old-fashioned special pleading based, apparently, on a sense of entitlement.

It only seems fair to publish the entire text of the judges' statement here, with my personal translation into plain English where I consider it necessary. If I think any of the judges' comments are waffle, I won't offer an interpretation.

Judge for yourself how I get on.

Re:  Proposed  Referendum  on  Article  35.5  of The  Constitution

Memorandum  on the  Proposed  Amendment

Original Translation 

1.  No  one doubts for a moment the  seriousness  of  the  economic  crisis facing  the  country.  The judiciary has not opposed the proposal for amendment of Article 35, section 5 of the Constitution. The  ultimate  decision  on  would,  of course,  be  entirely  a  matter  for  Oireachtas  and  the  People.  The issue here is not whether judges’ pay should be reduced, but rather how that reduction should be achieved, while effecting the least interference with the principle of independence of the Judiciary which that provision of the  Constitution is designed to protect. 

 

We’re not standing for for this.
2.  If judicial pay is cut, this will be the first time that this has occurred in the legal history of these islands since the Act of Settlement 1701. 

 

Blah blah blah
3.  Article  68  of  the  1922  Constitution  provided  that  the remuneration  of judges  “may  not  be  diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office”.  Writing in  1932  in  his  seminal  text, Professor  Kohn  observed  that  “The  independence  of  the  judges  has  been  further  safeguarded  by  the provisions  of  Article  68  of  the  Constitution  that  their  remuneration may  not  be  diminished  during  their  continuance  in  office.” 

 

Blah blah blah
4.  Article  35.5  of  the Constitution provides  that:- 

“The  remuneration  of  a  judge  shall  not  be  reduced  during  his continuance  in  office.”

5.  During  the  debate  on  the  Constitution,  Deputy  Norton  (then  leader  of  the Labour Party)  observed  with  regard  to  Article  35.5:-

“I  take  it  that  [Article 35.5]  is  intended  to  establish  the  independence of  the judiciary which  function through  [the  High  Court and the Supreme Court]  and  it  is  probably  intended  to demonstrate  to the community as a whole and to judges in particular that judges are not  liable to have their salaries reduced if for any reason they do things which incur the displeasure of the [Government].”

 

An opposition  politician in the 30s said we shouldn’t have a pay cut.
The  rationale  for  the  present  rule 

6.  Article  35.5  of our Constitution is designed  to  protect  judicial  independence

As  one  of  the  great  US  Founding  Fathers,  Alexander  Hamilton,  put  it  in The  Federalist  Papers, No.  79 at the time of the enactment of the US constitution:-

“Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a  power  over  a  Man’s  Subsistence amounts  to  a  power  over  his  Will.”

 

Judges should be paid big money.
7.  This principle is internationally acknowledged and cherished today.  The  words of  Hamilton  were  quoted  with  approval  by  a  majority  of  our  Supreme  Court in  O’Byrne  v. Minister  for  Finance  in  holding  that  Article  35.5  did  not exempt  judges  from  the  necessity  to  pay  income  tax: 

“The  purpose  of  the  Article  is  to  safeguard  the  independence  of judges. To  require  a  judge  to  pay  taxes  on  his  income  on  the  same basis  as  other  citizens  and  thus  to  contribute  to  the  expenses  of Government  cannot  be  said  to  be  an  attack  on  his  independence.”

 

 

Judges have to pay tax.
8.  Article III of the US Constitution provides that judicial compensation “shall not be diminished during their Continuation  in Office”,  words  which  clearly inspired  Article  68  of  the  1922  Constitution  and  Article  35.5  of  the Constitution. 

 

Blah blah blah
9.  The European Charter on the Statute for Judges, adopted at Strasbourg, 8 – 10 July  1998 under the auspices of the Council of Europe provides at Article  6.1: 

“Judges exercising judicial functions in a professional capacity are entitled to remuneration, the level of which is fixed so as to shield them from pressures aimed at influencing their decisions and more generally their behaviour within their jurisdiction, thereby impairing their independence and impartiality.”

 

Europe says judges should be paid big money.
10.  On 23rd November 2001, the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) adopted Opinion No 1, which included reference to Recommendation No. R (94) 12, which provided that judges’ remuneration should be guaranteed by law and commensurate with the dignity of their profession and burden of responsibilities and that that it was generally important (and especially so in relation to the new democracies) to make specific legal provision guaranteeing judicial salaries against reduction 

 

Europe says you shouldn’t cut our money.
11. The  underlying issue of principle is more complex. 

 

Mere  knowledge  that the  Oireachtas  has  the power to legislate  to  reduce  salaries  may be perceived, even if it is not so in fact, as having the  potential  either  to  pressurise  judges  on the  one  hand  or,  alternatively, make  them  liable  to  view  the  other  branches of  government  with  suspicion  or  even  hostility.  In  the  words  of  one  of  the most internationally respected judges  in  recent  times,  the  late  Lord  Bingham:-

 

“There is also, perhaps, another and subtler link between independence and remuneration.  In most societies, and subject to obvious exceptions, there is some perceived relationship between what someone earns and the status or prestige which he enjoys.  Financial rewards are not, of course, everything, but nor are they nothing.  Unless, therefore, the rewards of judicial office (with or without other benefits) are sufficient to attract the ablest candidates to accept appointment, albeit with some financial sacrifice, the ranks of the Judiciary must be filled by the second best, those who (under our system) have failed to make it in private practice, and there would be an inevitable lowering in the standing and reputation of the Judiciary and a sea change in the relationship between advocate and judge.”

 

If you don’t pay the judges big money, you’ll get fools.
12.  In O’Byrne v Minister for Finance Lavery J. observed that from a consideration of the  1922 Constitution and  the  corresponding provisions of Article  35 of  the  Constitution that:- 

 

“The idea emerges – that the judicial power of the State should be vested in judges set apart in many important ways from the life of the community and denied important civil rights in order that they should be independent in the exercise of their functions.”

 

One of our guys agreed with us.
13. A number of significant restrictions on a member of the Judiciary are explicit in the Constitution: 

 

disqualification from membership of the Oireachtas, and prohibition on the holding of any other officer of emolument:  Article  35.3.

 

Some of the constraints on the judiciary are regarded as implicit in the concept of independence, and  observed by convention since the foundation of the State : the fact that judges do not speak or engage on matters of public controversy; the convention that judicial appointment is normally for full service until retirement, and that, even on retirement, a retired judge should not pursue any vocation or employment either public or private, which is inappropriate for a judge.  Nor do the  judges  organise  collectively. All these are understood to be components of an independent judiciary.  In return, the Constitution provides for fixity of tenure, that a judge cannot be removed save for stated misbehaviour and then by separate resolutions of the Dáil and Seanad  (Article  35.4.1), and by a guarantee that remuneration will not be reduced (Article  35.5).

 

We have to follow the same rules as civil servants.
14.  It is clear that these matters are themselves essential requirements of the independence of the judiciary which is an essential component in the concept of separation of powers.  This  is why the guarantee  against  reduction  in  salaries is  deeply  embedded  not  only  in  the  Constitution, but  one  finds  it  throughout  the  constitutions  and  fundamental  laws  throughout  the  common  law  world. 

 

Blah blah blah
15. In  Canada, The  Provincial  Judges  Reference  held  that  the  reduction  in pay  of  provincial  court  judges  in order to  help  address  a budget deficit  was unconstitutional,  as  being  inconsistent  with  the  guarantee  of  judicial independence  contained  in  the  Canadian  Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  A majority  of  the  Canadian  Supreme  Court   held  that independent compensation commissions are required to enable salaries to be set free of political influence. 

The Court  pointed  out  that, if remuneration of provincial judges is to be raised, lowered or kept the same, this may be done along with the remuneration of other government employees or with the judges' alone. The continued independence of judges, however, will be kept apparent in any of these circumstances if it involves review by an "independent, effective, and objective" body, i.e., the salary commissions. What is involved in such circumstances is that, because what is being done is to the financial disadvantage of judges, it is important that the extent of discretionary power of the government of the day be kept to a minimum.

 

Furthermore,  judges  of  the  High  Court  and  Supreme  Court  are effectively debarred  by  the  Rules  of  the  Bar  Council  from  returning  to  legal practice  following  resignation  or  retirement.

As  Kennedy  C.J.  put  it  in James  O’Connor’s  case, these  principles:

“reflect  a  common  understanding  underlying  these  [judicial] appointments, that, with  security  of tenure and  fixed  and  adequate  remuneration and  pension, the  practice  of  the  profession  of  the  law  is abandoned for  ever  by  the  person appointed.”

 

 

The Canadian judges didn’t want a pay cut either.
16.  If,  however,  the  constitutional  principle  that there be no  reduction  in judicial  remuneration  is  altered,  then the  basis  for  the permanent abandonment by a judge of the practice of his profession is undermined.  The proposition that it is undesirable that  a  judge  to  return  to practice was explained by  Kennedy C.J.:- 

“There  is  good  and  powerful  reason in  support  of  such a  rule, for  it  is beyond  doubt that  if  a  man  should  step  down from the  privileged position  of  the  Bench and  throw  off  what  is a sacred  office  to  engage in the  rough-and-tumble  of  litigious  contest, and  compete  with practitioners for  the  feed  business  of  the  Court, perhaps  challenge the decisions  which  he  pronounced, or  even  fail  to  support  them  in argument, he  will  shake  the  authority of  the  judicial  limb  of government and  mar  the  prestige  and  dignity  of  the  Courts  of  Justice upon  which  the  whole  structure  of  the  State  must  always  lean.”

 

We can’t go back working as barristers because, if you paid us, we’d disagree with our own decisions.
17.  There is here a question of perception and fairness. If, for example, a High Court or Supreme Court judge  returned to practice and appeared before the High Court, then either the opposing counsel (and, more importantly, their clients) might feel that they were at an unfair disadvantage. But no one would be prepared to give up the right to practice a profession permanently if they did not have the assurance of fixity of salary and tenure of office. 

 

An ex-judge couldn’t go back working as a lawyer because everyone else would think he had the inside track with the judge, just like in real life.
18. The same is true with respect to Article 35.3. Thus, for example, a member of the Oireachtas (with whom,  as we shall see, judges may be expressly compared under the terms of the suggested wording at present available) who is unhappy with reduction in his or her salary can, for instance, supplement that by holding an office or position of emolument. There are numerous instances where Oireachtas members quite properly derive income as academics, lawyers, doctors, architects, teachers, company directors and so forth. 

 

19.  Why, then, should this rule be maintained in such circumstances if the quid pro quo – no reduction in pay – is being abandoned? Many continental judges (including, for example, judges of the Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court) hold offices of emolument for example as Professors in universities.  Other continental judges  engage in part-time arbitration and mediation work.

20.  Yet in a small jurisdiction such as ours, any relaxation of this rule might have unfortunate  consequences. Could, for example, a judge who engaged in part-time arbitration work continue to hear arbitration cases in his or her judicial capacity?

Fundamental flaws associated  with  the  existing suggested  wording

 

German judges hold down part-time jobs but we’re better than the Germans.
21.  According to press reports, the approach to the amendment seems to be grounded on the following  wording, attributed to the Department of Justice:- 

“The remuneration of judges shall not be reduced during their continuance in office save as may be regulated by law on the basis of reductions that are made by law, in the public interest, in the remuneration of persons generally or a class of such persons in the public service, including the Oireachtas and other office holders.”

 

22 .  It is fundamental that in any proposed amendment, which seeks to protect the independence of the judiciary, wide discretion is not left to the government of the day (and, by extension, the Oireachtas of the day which would be empowered to enact the appropriate legislation giving effect to the pay reductions) as to the circumstances in which and extent to which reductions in pay are implemented .  Otherwise, there is a risk of perception that the judiciary may be influenced by the government.

 

We don’t want the parliament passing any laws about our pay.
23.  The suggested draft wording invites a number of comments.  First, the language is extremely loose.  It would provide no limitation on the circumstances in which a reduction should be made; the government’s view of the “public interest” (as reflected in the legislation enacted by the Oireachtas) would suffice.  There is no method of calculating the reduction identified.  The only figure by reference to which such a reduction should be effected is contained in a phrase of very broad potential application, namely, “in the public interest”.  But perhaps most significantly, the bodies which are to be charged with deciding the reduction, both as to whether it is required and by reference to what comparator such reduction should be calculated, are the other branches of government, i.e., the Executive and Legislative branches.  At a minimum it might be thought that any amendment should closely and specifically identify the circumstances in which any deviation from the historic principles set out in Article 35.5 could be contemplated such as a financial crisis involving the public finances accompanied by the mechanism by which any salary reduction should be calculated, which should itself be independent of government. 

 

We’re better than the other civil servants.
24.   There would be furthermore nothing to stop the Oireachtas enacting legislation cutting the pay of any other office holder(s) and applying that particular pay cut to the judiciary.  There is nothing in the suggested wording of the proposed amendment to prevent a series of “tactical” cuts being applied to different classes of public servants, but each of whom can be applied to the judiciary. 

 

They might cut our money again.
25.  The proposed wording would also provide less safeguards than that previously proposed during the last Dáil in the 29th Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2009:- 

“The remuneration of a judge shall not be reduced during his continuance in office, save where it is necessary to address a serious threat to the State’s economy, there is a compelling need to stabilise the State’s finances and as a consequence it is necessary to effect a reduction in public service remuneration. In such circumstances, any reduction in the remuneration of all public servants or in the remuneration of a class of public servants may be applied to effect a comparable reduction in the remuneration of all members of the judiciary

 

They’re getting harder on us.
26. Even then, however, that Bill would have been open to the fundamental objection that it did not provide for an in-built mechanism for an independent review of the levels of the reduction of judicial pay. 

 

We’re better than other civil servants.
Conclusions 

27.  In our view, the suggested  wording as published in the press is fundamentally deficient and would compromise the substance of judicial independence in the manner indicated.  The principles of judicial independence require that any decision regarding judicial remuneration and the reduction in judicial pay must be taken by an independent body.

 

Blah blah blah
28.  If it were otherwise, one of the essential features of a constitutional democracy and the rule of law would be compromised. Many judges dealing with asylum and immigration cases have encountered country of origin information dealing with the position of judges in developing countries where the independence of the judiciary is parlous and where such judges have limited institutional independence. 

 

Blah blah blah
29.  A finding by a reputable international court or observations by an international organisation that these fundamental guarantees of constitutional independence had been – even unwittingly – compromised, were the suggested wording for the amendment to be adopted, would have huge reputational implications for Ireland and for confidence in our legal system. 

That confidence is not only a bulwark of the Constitution’s freedoms which we as citizens enjoy in a free society, but is an essential bedrock of economic confidence on which our recovery from the ordeal to which the State is at present subject is completely premised

 

Blah blah blah
30.  This memorandum is not prepared in opposition to an amendment of the Constitution so as to ensure that judges bear a fair share of the burden of pay reductions, but rather proposes that, if this is to be achieved, the essence of constitutional independence must be safeguarded by means of an independent adjudication on what these reductions should be. 

 

Don’t you dare cut our pay.


  12 Responses to “Judges Issue Statement on Proposed Amendment of Article 35.5”

Comments (12)
  1.  

    http://www.rte.ie/news/2011/0710/courts.html

    The Minister for Justice has said he asked the Courts Service to remove from its website a memorandum from the country's judges which criticises the wording of the Government's proposed referendum to reduce their pay
    In a statement tonight, Alan Shatter said he was surprised to learn of the posting which he said was essentially provided at State expense.
    He also said he was disappointed that the memo is still on the site and said he hopes corrective action will be taken.

  2.  

    Obviously it won't be taken down tonight. Why would people work for nothing at the weekends after their pay has been cut?

  3.  

    Thats whats wrong with this country…too many fat cat bums with bloated egos who think they are indispensable.Time to give them a reality check and if they dont like the pay cuts fuck them out with no pension and hire new ones…how difficult is that stupid profession anyhow.Anyone that can read and write could do it.

  4.  

    The answer is simple. Don't cut their pay, or even have a referendum about it, just tax any pay above the level the mInister for Finance wanted at 100%.

    Simple.

    Of course, it'll never happen here.

  5.  

    That caps all pay at a certain level. Not logical either.

  6.  

    I do like your interpretation.
    Very good, the 'good' judge won't like it though.
    Truth gets the bums-rush in the strangest of places; yea, even in chambers!

  7.  

    Nemo sit judex in causa sua, as the bishop said to the actress when he lectured her on the morality of sexual intercourse.

  8.  

    Our judges pay is double New York judges pay.Traditionally,the bench was a safety-net for failed solicitors and barristers.If they could'nt make it in their practice,alcoholism etc,their pals in power would put them on the bench.I have no sympathy for them.

  9.  

    I know it might seem like i am diverting things here, Mad dog has a point. An awful lot of these judges are are all failures at something, mostly failed politicians. They were awarded their positions in the judicial system for their loyalty to the party system, not because of any great legal expertease. I know, I know, there are one or two very good judges. It still does not take away how they got their jobs! Cronyism, political pull, just like the bankers and developers etc.

  10.  

    Just shows you how out of touch they are with us plebs

  11.  

    Heard on the news last night that the website is being taken down; today, I believe.

  12.  

    And so it should be. Judges using the Courts Service website for trade union statements are doing much the same as Willie O Dea sending out election pamphlets in Oireachtas envelopes.

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