Banking Economy Favourites NAMA

Killiney Eviction

Wait a minute now.  Let me just process this Killiney eviction story that RTÉ is getting in such a lather about.

On the face of it, the facts are truly shocking.  Here’s a man of 71, and his 63-year-old wife being ejected from their home by bailiffs.  Out on the side of the street with nowhere to go, in such destitution that they have to set up a leaky tent outside their former home, the couple huddle together for warmth while their neighbours look on in outrage.  Meanwhile, the brutal thugs hired by the banks have control of the family home where all the old couple’s treasured possessions lie unprotected from curious, grubby fingers.

An appalling scenario, reminiscent of the worst excesses of nineteenth-century landlordism in Ireland, as the man himself, Brendan Kelly, so tellingly pointed out.  Innocent poor people thrown out on the side of the road.

Well, maybe not.

Earlier reports failed to mention, for instance, that Brendan Kelly is himself a landlord who owns many rental properties around Dublin.  They failed to mention that the bank secured a repossession order against the couple two years ago.   And they failed to mention that Kelly wouldn’t sell any of his properties to pay off the money he owed to Irish Nationwide.  Of course, when I speak of the money he owes to Irish Nationwide, I really mean the money he owes to us, the Irish people, who now own that bank.  And when that putrid bank, now part of IBRC, writes off a two-million-euro debt, that’s €2 million more that we — you and I — must pump into the bank to compensate for the loss.

Did I mention that the poor old codgers, who have no children, were living in a €3-million five-bedroomed mansion in one of the most exclusive areas of Dublin?    They needed a house with five bedrooms so that they could move to a new bedroom when they got bored sleeping in the last one.  This is a basic human right.

Another thing RTÉ overlooked in its zeal to protect those who share the DNA of its executives is this: the bailiffs were not working for IBRC.  They were working for the Sheriff who was executing an order issued by a court, and therefore all the talk by Brendan Kelly about phoning the bank was just so much tosh.  He knew the order had been issued.  He had two years’ advance notice, and yet, somehow, the couple found themselves out on the street without so much as a jacket to shelter them from the rain.  Two years’ notice, and yet he didn’t take the elementary precaution of moving his computer or his files, even though these form the basis for his business.

One other thing RTÉ didn’t press too much was Brendan Kelly’s arrangement with Fingers Fingleton.   You see, ten years ago, in 2002, Fingers was prepared to lend a 61-year-old guy €2 million towards the cost of a €3.75 million house.  That’s what I said.  €3.75 million.

Now, of course, it’s true that the money might have been lent to his wife, Asta, who was 53 at the time, and maybe the loan was over 17 years, bringing it up to 2019.  This is not yet clear.  What is clear is that the couple weren’t able to meet the repayments on their house  and it just so happens that those loan repayments were owed to a bank owned by you and me.  Since it’s been covered extensively in previous items on this site, we won’t go into the reasons why we own this bank.  But we do.

Oddly for an accountant, Brendan wasn’t quite able to recall when he first fell into arrears.  He thinks it might be about three years ago.   His memory also lets him down when asked about the date of the repossession order, but he thinks it might have been about two years ago.  And so, for two years, Brendan did precisely what you’d expect an accountant to do: nothing.  He didn’t even move his office out of the house.

Now, as I said, Brendan and Asta own a sizeable portfolio of property around the more salubrious parts of Dublin including apartments in Simmonscourt Castle and Ballintyre Hall.  This is not the lower end of the market.  Brendan and Asta are doing pretty well compared to most.  How many Ballsbridge apartments do you own?

Let’s get our heads clear now.  They knew the bailiffs were coming.  They’d known about it for two years.  There was a court order.  They didn’t have the money to settle the debt, and yet they stayed in their €3.75 million luxury mansion, instead of doing what the rest of the country  would have to do: get out.

It never occurred to them that maybe it would be a good idea to move into one of the many other properties they own all over Dublin.  Why?  Presumably because they might have to mix with the lower orders.  How could one possibly survive in an ordinary luxury apartment without even a gated community around one for comfort and security?  Ridiculous!

And so they clung on, buoyed up by the moral support of their neighbours in their own €3.75 million mansions who were utterly shocked and outraged at such inhuman treatment of an elderly millionaire.  Surely he should be allowed to live out his remaining years in the opulence he’d grown accustomed to.

Now, of course, if the story happened to be about Anto and Sharon from Killinarden, I’m not so sure it would have been front-page and prime-time news, but this action by the Sheriff was a strike at the very heart of South Dublin affluence, the place from which our national broadcaster derives its reason for existence.  The place that defined not only the attitudes and ethos of RTÉ but also provided its management and even defined the very accent in which the station speaks.

In the RTÉ world, Ireland is divided in two: Dublin and TheCountry.

Dublin does not include Tallaght, Ballyfermot, Neilstown or any of those appendages that exist solely to provide stock stereotypes for bad drama.  Dublin is anything south of Donnybrook, but excluding embarrassing local authority housing estates in the likes of Dun Laoghaire.

TheCountry is the rest of us muck-savages, or the majority of the population, as we like to describe ourselves.

Why is this story so big on the airwaves?  Simple: it’s the first time anything like this happened in Dublin, the only place that matters.  Meanwhile, in a development so laden with irony, the Occupy movement has moved in to support the Kellys, even though their transaction with Fingleton was the sort of thing that bankrupted Irish Nationwide in the first place.

A peculiar, and sympathetic, form of ageism permeates the reportage, with the couple described as “elderly”.  Brendan Kelly is a sprightly and razor-sharp 71, while his wife, Asta, is a woman of working age.  Neither of them are people in their dotage, and yet the implication seems to be that they were a bit confused when they got drawn into this mortgage, or else that they can’t understand what’s happening to them now.  Brendan wasn’t so confused that he couldn’t consult his computer to keep track of the various tenancies he makes money from.

The poor old devil isn’t that confused, God bless him, and neither is his incredibly ancient 63-year-old wife, who just happens to be a year older than Enda Kenny, the man who heads our government, and who is never described by anyone as elderly.  She’s five years younger than Vincent Browne — try calling him elderly and see what he tells you.

It’s time to call this story for what it is.  Bullshit.

Here’s a couple who owe a State-owned bank €2 million but want to hold onto their high-value mansion while at the same time renting out luxurious apartments all over Dublin, a couple who pull a ridiculous stunt by setting up a tent in the street instead of doing what the rest of us would have to do — move into a smaller place and get used to it.

So this childless couple can’t have the pleasure of occupying five bedrooms?  So what?  Get over it, and stop bombarding us with a non-story when real people are being evicted all over the country without a choice of alternative properties to live in.

I find it nauseating that this well-off man should insult the memory of those evicted in the hard times by comparing himself to the oppressed Irish of the nineteenth century.  No en-suite bathroom?  This is truly a First World Problem.



It turns out that the Kellys also own 13 apartments in London.



More Bock the Robber posts on the economy






IMF Warns of Global Economic Collapse Due To Euro Crisis

The IMF is now saying that small countries shouldn’t be rescuing the European banking system on their own and that the EU as a whole should step in to deal with failed institutions.  That’s a bit late for us.  It was obvious to anyone with eyes in their head that it was a European problem, and not solely the responsibility of individual governments and the clue is in the name: European Union.  Yet for the last three years, this country has pushed the burden of the collapsed banks onto the backs of a tiny and financially exhausted population.
In doing this, we have adopted a language that fails to reflect the reality of what is happening.  We speak of bailouts, rescues and of protecting the banking system.   As recently as today, an Irish Times article about the Euro crisis refers to the recapitalisation of Anglo-Irish bank.

Christine Lagarde

Stop, I want to tell them.  Listen to what you’re saying.

Anglo was not recapitalised, and neither was Irish Nationwide.  Both of these companies are dead.  They are no longer banks.  They can’t be recapitalised.  What happened was that a huge amount of money was appropriated from Irish citizens and given to speculators who had taken a risk on these pyramid schemes masquerading as banks and who were in danger of losing their bets.  A significant amount remains to be paid to the same people.

Can we get that absolutely plain?  As far as Anglo and Nationwide are concerned, there is no bailout, no rescue and no recapitalisation.  It’s a straight transfer of cash out of your pocket and into someone else’s wallet.

Of the Troika members, the IMF has consistently taken the view that Ireland should not have to carry the burden alone, and that investors should be forced to share the loss.  Even though my view is that the shareholders should have been told to get stuffed, at least the IMF’s view is more rational that that of the ECB and the European Commission.  Even the Financial Times has been arguing that the bondholders should be given a debt-for-equity swap, which translates roughly into Congratulations. You now own a bust bank.

Two banks, which are currently the subject of a major police investigation, collapsed with huge debts as a result of bad management decisions.  They were private companies, with private investors, they served as conduits for property developers’ money and they had no role in the broader economy.  Neither bank had so much as a single ATM on a single street corner in the entire country.  Despite what we were told, if they had been allowed to collapse, nothing at all would have happened, and yet our government decided that you and I should make sure none of the investors lost a penny.

This is the great mystery of the insane bank guarantee scheme devised by Brian Lenihan in 2008.  This man was not a fool, so why on earth did he decide to sacrifice the future of generations in order to ensure that investors in a private company would not suffer?  The answer to this question will explain why Ireland is now so crushed beneath debts.  I believe that it lies in a combination of pressure from the ECB and a fear that some very dirty things would be exposed.

What might those dirty secrets be?  Well, perhaps they might include the amount of debt the two Ponzi banks owned involving senior politicians, judges, police, senior civil servants and all the other members of the elites in this little state.  Or to put it another way, it might expose the amount of favours that had been bought, and if that happened, who knows what sort of contagion might have been triggered?  Before you know it, one dirty secret might expose the next until the whole thing lay bare.  Much easier to sell generations of Irish children into poverty and emigration.

Ridiculous as Lenihan’s call to patriotic action was, at least it came from a man of privilege and member of the corrupt ruling party.  What would you expect from him?  But to hear Lenihan’s puffed-up Fianna Fáil nonsense repeated by Eamon Gilmore was nothing short of nauseating.  The Labour Party leader urged the opposition to pull on the green jersey and support the government in its talks with the Troika.  I remember when Eamon Gilmore had principles, but this statement was worthy of Bertie Ahern at his most venal.

Of course, there were those who insisted from the start that we should not take on these obligations, that it was foolish, and there were even some who said that the decision to do so was treason, including the same Eamon Gilmore who now calls on us to pull on the green jersey.  Gilmore made this charge against Brian Cowen little more than a year ago under parliamentary privilege, accusing him of knowing that Anglo was bankrupt when he issued the guarantee.

Not so long ago, we heard Pat Rabbitte, another Labour minister who once had principles, defending the disgraceful give-away of our gas and oil to multinational companies for nothing, so what exactly are we to make of our political leaders?  I don’t know.  Personally, I think we have no hope of mature political leadership in this country.  It seems to be a choice between Fine Gael, who are really Fianna Fáil, Labour who are quickly becoming Fianna Fáil, or the Shinners, who will eventually become Fianna Fáil.  Maybe we don’t deserve anything but gobshites in government.

Things are coming to a head, now that Christine Lagarde, the IMF head, has spoken so bluntly of the dangers facing the world economy.

Anglo and Irish Nationwide, the two dead banks, are now amalgamated into an entity called the Irish Banking Resolution Corporation (IBRC), or the First Bad Bank of Ireland, depending on your point of view.  This is the entity that gets all the banking money we borrow from the EU and the IMF, and while it’s true that Ireland’s costs involve more than simply pumping money into this bad bank, it’s a very large component of our costs.  We borrow €3.1 billion every year to pump into this financial black hole which in turn pays out a pile of money to creditors.

Now here’s the conundrum.  The famous promissory notes that everyone talks about attract an interest rate of 8.6%.  This is the IOU that the Irish government provided to Anglo.   And Anglo, in turn, was able to go to the only outside bank that would lend it a penny — the ECB, from which it got money at something like 2%.  Unfortunately, the idea of reducing the interest rate won’t save us anything, because we already own Anglo.  Whatever margin it makes on the money will come back to the exchequer in time.

The real disaster is that the cash is gone.   It’s been handed over to the investors who couldn’t believe their luck that some idiot was going to cover the losses they’d already written off.  If we had declined to take these losses onto ourselves, nothing at all would have happened.   In this respect, Anglo and Nationwide were no different from a company making engines or matchsticks.  Private companies go bust all the time.  Ireland’s credit rating would not have been reduced, since the liabilities were those of two private corporations and there was absolutely no reason why any government should take them over.

But as we know now, that’s not what happened, for reasons that have yet to be exposed.  My own view is that the lunacy of the banking guarantee was caused by a mixture of hubris, stupidity and corruption, although I don’t think these three things were necessarily all present at the same time, or in the same people.

Now that the IMF has come out so blatantly and pointed at Europe as the problem, perhaps it will be possible to re-examine the Irish bailout deal with the Troika, although in truth, it’s very hard to see where the scope for renegotiation exists, now that all our money has been stolen with the connivance of successive Irish governments.




Ballsy Baldy Burns Bank Bondholders

Michael Noonan has decided to make the the bondholders carry a share of the losses, thereby restoring capitalism to its proper place: a risky business, conducted for profit with the corresponding danger of losing money.

We don’t think the Irish taxpayer should have to redeem what has become speculative investment, Noonan is reported to have told the IMF.

It’s ironic that it took a member of what would traditionally be considered a party of the Right to articulate this obvious point.  The decision of Lenihan and Cowen to shoulder the debts of Anglo and Irish Nationwide was insane, and should never have been inflicted on the general public.

If you think this is the 20-20 vision that comes with hindsight, let me remind you that people were saying this right from the start.  Anglo and Irish Nationwide were not banks in any sense you might ordinarily understand.  Anglo was a funding operation for speculators, while Nationwide was a building society taken far beyond its remit by Fingleton.  The debts of neither institution properly belonged to the State.

Even the Financial Times, a bastion of orthodoxy, urged the government to impose a debt-for-equity swap on the bondholders, but Lenihan and Cowen stuck to their original script even as the problem grew to cataclysmic dimensions, threatening the survival of Ireland as a country.

If Anglo and Nationwide had been allowed to collapse, it would have made not the slightest difference, except that we and our children wouldn’t now be saddled with enormous debts.

It’s too early to say if Noonan is just sabre-rattling or serious, but I hope he means what he says.   When it comes down to it, he’s defending the principles of capitalism, and therefore, in theory, he should have the support of like-minded politicians throughout Europe.




Nama Winelake

Banking Favourites

Nyberg Report — Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland

Here are some quotes from the report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland.


  • International developments … did not in themselves cause the crisis though they helped precipitate it.


  • The willingness of banks to accept higher risks by providing more and shockingly larger loans primarily for commercial property deals was an important reason for the gradual increase in financial fragility in Ireland.


  • By mid-decade, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo) and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) were growing strongly on the basis of relationship banking, providing loans to a limited number of entrepreneurs operating in the riskier parts of the property market.


  • Bank loans seem to have expanded so rapidly because neither banks nor borrowers apparently really understood the risks they were taking. Many banks were increasingly led and managed by people with less practical experience of credit and risk management than before


  • Banks, citing the long sequence of good years, generally saw little problem in expanding their lending by allowing credit quality and risk management to gradually erode. Likewise, households and investors had seen their incomes and wealth increase markedly for a number of years; easy access to credit further encouraged belief in a never-ending boom. In essence, both sides of the market assumed that the other side knew what it was doing.


  • A self-reinforcing spiral developed: higher prices and values caused increased speculative buying of housing and land; evaluators based their estimates on these higher prices; this increased the demand and collateral for bank lending, which in turn raised prices as more funding was provided


  • A minority of people indicated that contrarian views were both difficult to maintain during the long boom and unhealthy to present to boards or superiors.


  • The Commission considers that this pervasive pressure for consensus may explain why so many different parties in Ireland simultaneously were willing to adopt specific policies and accepted practices that later proved unsound.


  • A number of banks essentially appear to have followed the example of peer banks in a “herding” fashion; there is little evidence of original critical analysis of the advantages and risks of the policies. Widespread lack of critical discussion within many banks and authorities indicates a tendency to “groupthink”; serious consideration of alternatives appears to be modest or absent.

Flawed lending: Anglo and INBS

  • Contrary to public perception at the time, lending at Anglo and INBS had proceeded with insufficient checks and balances during the Period.  Relationship lending, high-growth strategies and rapid credit decisions meant that their balance sheets increased as the projects of preferred customers grew


  • Governance at these banks also fell short of best practice. While procedures and processes in Anglo existed on paper, in certain cases they were not properly implemented or followed in practice. It appears that, at least in the latter years, only a handful of management was aware of all activities of the bank. At INBS, a number of essential, independent  functions either did not effectively exist or were seriously under-resourced.


  • The Financial Regulator(FR)  was clearly aware of many of these problems in the two banks. Prior to the commencement of the Period, and consistently throughout, it raised significant concerns regarding governance at INBS. It also submitted a comprehensive list of procedural and portfolio problems to Anglo. It furthermore raised minimum capital ratios for both banks. However, such remedies did not prove effective to ensure sufficiently greater prudence and accountability in either of the banks.

The Herd: Other Banks

  • Bank management and boards in some of the other covered banks feared that, if they did not yield to the pressure to be as profitable as Anglo, in particular, they would face loss of long-standing customers, declining bank value, potential takeover and a loss of professional respect. The few that admitted to feeling any degree of concern at the change of strategy often added that consistent opposition would probably have meant formal or informal sanctioning.
  • It appears to have been difficult for individual members, especially those without banking experience, to express and maintain a view contrary to the majority view on the board.


  • Over time, managers known for strict credit and risk management were replaced;


The Silent Observers: External Auditors

  • … banks had to be rescued from closure by the Government Guarantee in some instances not more than six months after being given clean audit opinions.


  • The problems in the Irish banks were building for several years before the crisis. These were problems of credit quality, sustainable lending practices and  adequacy of internal procedures; they were not generally operational problems related to the IT  systems or the mechanics of loan documentation. Auditors, therefore, did not feel that commenting on the implications of such business model problems fell within their proper remit. In fact, it may be questioned whether they even saw them as problems since very few others appear to have seen them either. On these issues, they appear generally to have stayed silent.


  • The Central Bank (CB) and the FR noted macroeconomic risks and risky bank behaviour but appear to have judged them insufficiently alarming to take major restraining policy measures. Among all the authorities a very limited number of individuals, either in boards or among staff, saw the risks as significant and actively argued for stronger measures; in all cases they failed to convince their colleagues or superiors.


  • There may have been a state of denial in the CB; warnings of stability risks appear to have been sidestepped internally or, when made public especially in the Financial Stability Reports, toned down in the policy conclusions. Trust in a soft landing was consistent and, though not very well founded, continued up until and including the crisis management phase of the Period.


  • The CB was not powerless; it had the right to direct the activities of the FR and it could advise the Government. There are, however, no records of such direction or advice or even efforts at such. These institutions worked separately and their respective independence was repeatedly stressed; however, this was counteracted by their partly common board members. Until the crisis, many of the staff of the CB and the FR apparently did not cooperate in a sufficiently meaningful way in assessing financial stability. This, together with the determined optimism and caution of senior management, may help explain why so few staff were seriously concerned about stability issues at the time. It appears that each of the authorities ultimately assumed that the other conscientiously fulfilled its prudential tasks. Thus, less was done than either of them assumed.


  • The problems in Anglo and INBS in particular, were not hidden but were in plain sight of the FR and the CB. The funding strategy of Anglo was obvious from its balance sheet and the concentration to the more speculative part of the market was generally known. Similarly, INBS’s expansion into development lending was also clearly documented and the governance problems in the bank were widely known by the authorities.


  • Generally, international organisations (IMF, EU, and OECD) were, at most, modestly critical and often complimentary regarding Irish developments and institutions. This gave the authorities and the banks additional reason to assume that all really was well. Domestic doubters were few, late and usually lowkey, possibly because it was thought that expressing contrarian views risked sanction; in addition, a long period of good times had reduced the numbers of those willing to continue to go against the prevailing and apparently proven consensus.

Policy with Insufficient Information: the Guarantee

  • Proper information is a precondition for any crisis management based on reality. As it turned out, decisions were made on the erroneous assumption that all banks were and would remain solvent. Only on that assumption could the decision to simply provide a broad guarantee be understood.


  • If accurate information on banks’ exposures had been available at the time it seems quite likely to the Commission that a more limited guarantee combined with a state take-over of at least one bank might have been more seriously contemplated. Indeed, on the basis that such information had been available, banks could have been directed to raise substantially more private capital well before end-September 2008. As it turned out, however, the Government was advised that banks’ insolvency risks were small relative to liquidity risks and it was eventually decided not to consider nationalisation.



Banking Favourites

Financial Regulator Says Anglo and Nationwide in Good Shape

Here’s a note of a meeting held three days before the blanket bank guarantee. During this meeting, the financial regulator tells Cowen and Lenihan there’s no reason to believe Anglo and Irish Nationwide are insolvent.

A finance official speculates that combined losses could be 10.5 billion euros.

It seems they had no idea what they were dealing with.

Public Accounts Committee

Banking Crime Economy Favourites

Irish Bank Guarantees

Correct me if you think I’m wrong, but I believe that an agreement depends on both parties meeting their obligations.

Otherwise, it isn’t an agreement.

It now seems that the Irish government guaranteed a mind-boggling amount of money, €450 billion, on the basis of lies.  Anglo-Irish Bank falsified its accounts, and now it seems Bank of Ireland and AIB may turn out to have significantly more bad debts than was disclosed on the night of the guarantee.  Irish Nationwide, of course, is a joke bank, as I’ve been saying here for quite a while.

Brian Lenihan offered this guarantee without knowing how exposed the banks were to bad debt.  In other words, he wrote a blank cheque, using the sovereign resources of this country, paid for by you and by me.  He offered your wages and mine to the crooks who head our banking system without imposing a single condition on them.

Now, this bank guarantee threatens to drag this entire country into oblivion if it turns out that the banks have more bad debts than we thought, because the government will have to cover those losses.

What does this mean?

It means wholesale job losses, evictions, poverty and hardship.  That’s what it means, because bastards like Seán Fitzpatrick and Fingers Fingleton have been playing the odds in the financial bookie-shop for years, and because they and Fianna Fáil are so closely bound together that the government can’t afford to let them fall in case they start talking.

It means that the fault for this disaster lies with the banks, the finance minister, the Taoiseach and the deeply-ingrained corruption at the heart of Fianna Fáil.

It isn’t about people maxing their credit cards, or taking out big mortgages.  Those people will eventually pay off their debts after a strong dose of reality hits them.

It isn’t about nurses, teachers and firemen being paid too much.

It’s about the banks lending ridiculous amounts of money to speculators, who were in bed with the ruling party in this country, without any regard to the possibility that those speculators might not pay them back.  It’s about the Irish government, led by a corrupt party with a vested interest, protecting the people who have traditionally supplied the bribes that keep them in comfort.

It’s about the chairman of the most crooked bank, Anglo-Irish, being a close buddy of our former prime minister, Bertie Ahern, who jumped ship with impeccable timing, just before the whole mess exploded.

It’s about Anglo-Irish bank fraudulently lending €300 million to 10 members of the golden circle that surrounds Fianna Fáil, to buy its own shares.  It’s about the fact that those loans were 75% secured against shares which are now worthless.  It’s about the fact that this money is lost to the State which now owns Anglo-Irish Bank.  It’s about the convenient legal flaw in the loan agreements relieving the 10 crooks of responsibility for giving back the remaining €75 million they were lent.

Did you ever borrow money from a bank?  Did you ever get to keep the money because the bank made a mistake in the paperwork?  No.  Me neither.

It’s about Fianna Fáil guaranteeing Anglo-Irish Bank instead of letting it collapse as it deserved to.

It’s about our incompetent finance minister pumping €7 billion into Bank of Ireland and AIB, even though any intelligent observer could see it wouldn’t be enough.

It’s about the fact that he did this without knowing how bad the situation in those banks was, and he still doesn’t know.

I’ll say this again.

Anglo and Irish Nationwide were joke banks and should never have been propped up.  They were not part of the legitimate economy and would have crashed without too much damage to the country.

There’s more to this bail-out than meets the eye.  Any rational government would have conducted due diligence procedures before offering any guarantees to the remaining banks, but this government didn’t.


Because they’re afraid of their lives that if any of these crooks end up in the dock in front of a judge, they’ll start singing, and they won’t stop singing until they’ve named every last politician who was on their payroll, and every last dirty deal facilitated by the ruling party in return for that largesse.

Consequently, they jeopardised the futures of every person on this island, and those not yet conceived.

It was treason.

Go and dig into this, and you’ll see where the cancer started and how it spread.

You want directions?

Ok.  Start with Haughey and follow your nose, if you can stand the smell.


Also on Bock:



Irish Times: Bank guarantee likely to deal a crippling blow to the economy

Problems in real economy dwarf those of bank sector


Irish Nationwide Building Society Send Out Begging Email. What a Crowd of Shits!

I will have no tolerance for any financial institution which seeks to exploit competitive advantage from this guarantee, said Brian Lenihan, our Finance Minister.

Oh really? said Irish Nationwide.  Well fuck you, Brian Lenihan, and fuck the taxpayer you rode in on.

And so, these unutterable cunts sent out the following email to one global bank, and perhaps to many others:

Irish Nationwide Building Society – Government Guaranteed UK Savings Accounts

As you may be aware on Tuesday 30th September the Irish Government put in place a guarantee arrangement to safeguard all deposits (retail, commercial, institutional and Interbank), covered bonds, senior debt and subordinated debt (lower tier II) with Irish Banks.

As Irish Nationwide qualifies under this scheme we now represent the safest place to deposit money in Europe with a AAA guarantee from a country with the lowest national debt to GDP ratio of any AAA country.

Irish Nationwide are offering the following GBP£ products for savers:

Six month 6.75% fixed rate bond (Irish Government Guarantee for any amount)
One year 7.10% fixed rate bond (Irish Government Guarantee for any amount)
Money in these accounts are guaranteed regardless of the size of deposit and represent the best value in the UK market.

I can provide application and opening forms by email if required. Please be so kind as to pass on to friends, colleagues and clients as you see fit. Should you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me directly on xxxxxxxxx or xxxx in the office.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Kind Regards,

Michael Fingleton (Jnr)

Irish Nationwide Building Society
122 Wigmore Street
London W1U 3RX

You see?  The Dáil had barely discussed the bail-out before these fucking bastards decided to ride us bareback, touting for business on the strength of our guarantees.

Would you like me to translate Fingleton’s letter into English for you? Forget all this jargon about fixed-rate bonds and subordinated debt.  That’s only  bullshit.  This is what the letter really says:

We’re bulletproof thanks to that fool of a Finance Minister who put his entire country into hock to bail us out.

We were fucked because we lent too much money to too many crooks and we’ll never get it back.  We were fucked, but luckily that fool of a Finance Minister risked everything, instead of letting us collapse like the dickheads we are.

Woo fucking hoo!!

We’re bulletproof.  Send us your money and the stupid Paddies will sell their children to keep it safe.

Tell everyone.

All the best

Mickey Fingers

That, in essence, is what the fucking bastard is actually saying.

Irish Nationwide has described the email as inappropriate and regrettable.

Inappropriate?  Like we’d need to be John Maynard Keynes to figure that out?  Inappropriate my fucking arse.  It’s a well-known one-fingered gesture to the Irish people, that’s what it is.  Inappropriate?  Bollocks.

Regrettable?  What sort of two-faced hypocrisy is that?  What the fuck do they regret?  Nothing, except getting caught.  The fucking bastards.

As the proverbial dogs in the street know, Irish Nationwide are in serious trouble.  Their problems go far beyond lack of liquidity, and no government guarantees are going to fix their problems.

They’re on the brink of insolvency, and this email is plain evidence of just how desperate they are. Now is the time to withdraw the guarantee from them and let them collapse naturally.  The other banks, who have acted slightly more prudently, will still be around to operate the money system.

But that won’t happen, because this little country is too cosy, with too many little cabals and good-buddy golf club deals.  No matter how it goes, this government will drain the blood from you and me rather than see their pals in trouble.  They’ll screw you and screw you again, because this government are a crowd of incompetent fucking crooks and I’ve been telling you that for the last two and a half years.

Do you know what? Maybe we should all just bend over now, and get finished with it.



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